The elite-led globalization and the erosion of East Asian values

I just attended the first day of an East-West dialogue organized yearly in Barcelona. Among the speakers was UN Deputy Secretary General for Communications, Mr. Kiyotaka Akasaka, who talked about Asian values as opposed to Western values, citing examples related to job preservation in companies within a context of economic crisis in Japan, thus helping explain why unemployment has not risen substantially in a country that has been affected by underwhelming growth rates and deflation for more than 20 years. I think that Mr. Akasaka is right in the example he cited, but wrong in extrapolating such values to the wider East Asian region, and much less to the whole of Asia.

Before focusing on our argument, we should first clarify some terminology choices. It might be argued that, instead of using the term "Asian values" (or, more narrowly, "East Asian values"), we should be speaking of a set of values corresponding to group-oriented societies, as opposed to individual-oriented societies, mostly rooted in Calvinist and Lutheran Christianism and with the United States and the United Kingdom as paradigmatic and leading examples. However, here I argue that East Asian nations can not be considered as purely "group-oriented", a definition that would better fit, for instance, most predominantly Muslim societies.

Indeed, East Asian tradition, based on Confucianist, Sintoist and Taoist principles, dictates not only an harmonious social order, but also stresses the individual's ultimate responsibility to succeed (in order to lead the family in a virtuous manner, in the case of men, and to adhere by the rules and work hard within their sphere of influence, in the case of women). Therefore, we should in fact be speaking of a mixed societal model, combining group-oriented elements as well as some of the most extreme approaches to individualism. Consequently, it makes sense to differentiate those so-called (East) Asian values from Western (or, for that matter, Muslim ones).

It is this mixed character of East Asian values the one that explains its partial erosion coupled with economic development. However, as Mr. Akasaka somehow pointed out, there is an exception among the three developed countries in the region: Japan. Even though global trends are also affecting Japan's business culture and eroding notions such as lifetime employment, as well as affecting equality levels, the insular state still resists some extreme individualist tendencies that have already taken hold in South Korea and are creating a two-speed China, with a rapidly growing wealth gap between even richer urbanites and privileged classes (which are well known for not sharing their wealth with the wider society via charities or other social endeavors and that alledegly would not mind deserting their home country in order to enjoy their privileged lifes far away from pollution, food unsafety and cultural repression).

Younger South Koreans, for their part, are widely known for their extreme competitiveness, consumerism and individualism, as shown by the eroding support for national reunification on economic concerns. Moreover, the South Korean is one of the most unequal modern societies: while its GINI inequality index is far away from China's third-world levels, the country, ranking 15th on the recently released UNDP Human Development Index, sees how its privileged position turns into a not-so-brilliant 28th place when adjusting for inequality levels, in what means the sharpest drop among all nations not named United States of America (which falls from the 4th to the 23rd position when adjusting results for inequality).

Although a plausible explanation lies in the fact that Japan was allowed to keep its peculiar mix of modern-traditional culture after its defeat in World War II, thus allowing a smooth transition to a post-totalitarist social-democratic system, Korea had its national pride, economic system and cultural values shattered after the long Japanese invasion, the division of the peninsula in two and the subsequent Korean War, while China underwent a dramatic transformation under Maoism and the precepts of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.


However, there is another important factor that should not be overlooked when assessing this difference: timing in economic development. Japanese economy boomed during the 60s (over 10% average growth during that decade), kept growing strongly during the 70s and, by the 80s, it was already a world leading economy (prompting many U.S. analysts and intellectuals to warn about the Japanese threat to U.S. supremacy, helping the U.S. Government successful bid to force Japan's central bank to let the yen revalue against the dollar, thus accelerating the advent of Japanese economic stagnation). Continued growth during that decade was based on real estate and investment bubbles that burst by the end of the decade and prompted a lengthy period of subpar growth and deflation from which Japan seems unable to exit. 

Japan's transition to a modern, world-leading economy took place during the 60s and the 70s, during the height of the post-World War II social contract, under the Bretton Woods system, the Western European social democracies and the growing social network in the U.S., which reached its apex during the Carter administration. In a global context of Cold War and with the existance of what was perceived as a viable economic and political alternative, Communism, ruling over the USSR and China, European and U.S. economic and political elites, fearing the spread of Soviet-sponsored revolutions across Asia and, above all, Western Europe, consented to the demands of workers and labor unions and installed a series of successful welfare states, where state-run companies amounted to a sizeable share of the total economic output and where inequality was restrained by means of high rates of progressive taxes and relatively high salaries for low- and mid-tier employees.

However, this unprecedented social contract began to crumble under the weight of Margaret Tatcher and Ronald Reagan. The first, after the undeniable failure of the country's finances and subsidy-based social policies under Edward Heath and Harold Wilson [1], and the second, decided to strike a decisive blow to a stagnating and overstretched Soviet Union after the progressive economic opening of Deng's China, allied to set the foundations of a new economic paradigm, neoliberalism. Fed by the technological revolution and the prompt end of the Soviet Union, it set the foundations of today's globalized economy while also sowing the deregulation seeds that flourished in the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis.

It is in this more unstable context that South Korea consolidated its growth, from one of the poorest countries on Earth after the end of the Korean War (1953) to a technological and economic global power in the 21st century. The military dictatorships that ruled the country did not really kick-start and consolidate its economic growth until the 1970s, under Park Chung-hee. Growth continued strong during the 80s, by the end of which decade the country already enjoyed a democracy. The hiccups of the 1997 financial crisis notwithstanding, the technological advances and market globalization of the 90s and the 00s only consolidated South Korea's growth model, partially based on the Japanese family-run, state-sponsored big companies but with a far more individualistic and neoliberal approach (despite the obvious protectionism of its internal market) that reached its apex during the last few years, under President Lee Myung-bak.

China's case is even more extreme. As previously mentioned, China only started to open its previously quasi-autarkic socialist economy after Mao Zedong's death in 1976 and the innovation and reform policies introduced by Deng Xiaoping. In other words, China's race to the top started at the same time that neoliberalism made its appearance on the world scene, and picked up speed precisely when the current wave of market-led globalization took off, i.e. during the last two decades, exporting and expanding transnational company culture and elite-controlled investment flows all around the globe. It is within this context that values consumption and individual wealth that China, coming off 40 years of state-led socialist limitations to private entrepreneurship -- undeniably a strong psychological factor that gives even more sense to the conscious choice of many Chinese for a radical change of approach, for individualist wellbeing as opposed to common wellbeing --, has become the world's second economic power, although one with acute internal inequalities and still with the status of middle income economy.

Add to that the fact that rapid growth processes tend to lead to inequality, especially during the transition from a low income to a middle income economy, coupled with the material, physical and economic deprivation that both Chinese and Koreans had experienced for generations (unlike the Japanese, who enjoyed great power and a prosperous economy until, albeit partially based on cruelly oppressing their neighbours, their defeat in World War II) and we have a cocktail which is explosive enough to explain the erosion, at least on the social equality camp, of the so-called East Asian values in those countries.

[1] Although the pre 1979 Labour government almost needed help from the IMF, arguably it was because it had invested heavily in drilling oil on the North Sea. When Margaret Thatcher came to power, the first oil came ashore after 15 years of investment. The cost of oil exploration by British Petroleum and British Gas is why the UK needed financial help: oil proved difficult to find and banks pulled out. The British people used to own these two companies with profits going to the public purse. However, the Tatcher government quickly privatized them.

Bilateral triangulation: the DPRK, the ROK and the US amid renewed talks

News broke out during the recent ASEAN Regional Forum meeting, held on July 26-27. Two days earlier, it had been speculated that the U.S. planned to meet on the sidelines with North Korean representatives. They did eventually meet, but South Korea was the first to do it, allegedly under heavy pressure from both the United States and China -- craving stability after the dangerous tension of 2010 -- to accept North Korea's willingness to talk. Both meetings, focused on the eventual denuclearization of the Korean peninsula were considered a very positive first step by all involved parties.

Washington, assuming that any move to contact North Korea unilaterally could damage Seoul’s credibility and role in future negotiations – as also attested by South Korean officials and media, who claimed that Seoul should play the leading role in any negotiations at the first hint of a North Korea-U.S. meeting[1] –, probably leaked the plans, prompting a swift South Korean reaction: the first meeting on the sidelines with the DPRK had Seoul’s top nuclear envoy as the protagonist on July 22.

However, Washington secured the visit of a top North Korean diplomat – Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan – to New York, where he is scheduled to meet Washington's envoy for Korean peninsula affairs, Stephen Bosworth. The same day he landed in the U.S., the North Korean side expressed that finally signing a peace treaty ending the Korean War would be “the first step for settling the Korean issue, including denuclearization”.[2] 

However, once again, the US were quick to engage Seoul and make sure its ally had a say and felt actively and relevantly engaged in any negotiations – thus trying to trump North Korea’s strategic gamble, based on their typical approach of having two powerful partners (whom they aim to treat as diplomatic equals to Pyongyang) ready to collide (like the US and China right now), while alienating Seoul and extracting benefits from all parties involved – by putting a North Korean apology for last year`s sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on the agenda.[3]

This clear and encouraging example shows the two-sided approach of the Obama administration towards the Korean issue. As already stated during the Presidential campaign, the Obama team is open to dialogue with North Korea, having fostered this recent round of talks when grasping North Korea’s desire to negotiate, partly shown by Kim Jong-il’s recent visits to China (also used as a diplomatic test for the U.S.: talk with us or see us definitely fall into China’s lap) and his failed trip to the Russian far east to meet President Medvedev. 

However, and despite clear ideological differences with President Lee’s strategic views, the U.S. approach also shows respect for the leading role South Korea has to play in all negotiations, looking hard not to alienate Seoul by giving it the due priority in initiating talks with the North in Bali and by reminding North Korea that apologies for last years’ provocations were due to Seoul.


What the U.S. negotiators are almost certain to do will be forcing Kim Jong-il’s government into acknowledging the strategic impossibility of making its Washington-Beijing diplomatic grand bargain work, despite mounting North Korean pressure to extract preemptive diplomatic gains: as reported by the Washington Post, North Korea has already issued several statements aimed at obtaining an initial advantage in any negotiation, first asking the U.S. United States to sign a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War, and later warning that a new nuclear arms race could start if the U.S. continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal and expand its missile defense systems.

One more reason why Washington is not going to fall into Pyongyang's trap is its clear will to maintain a smooth military and security relationship with South Korea . With the main goal of preserving the current security status quo in East Asia by both deterring North Korea and hedging against the rapidly expanding Chinese military power, the Obama administration has been notably hawkish on this side of relations. The recent change of the chief of the 28,000 American troops stationed in Korea for a more battle-tested general attests that, under the Obama administration, the alliance has been reinforced. Equally telling is the fact that Lockheed Martin seems willing to outsource production of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and transfer stealth technology to Korea in case Seoul decides to buy such aircraft.[4] According to Lockheed’s Stephen O’Bryan, U.S. government has approved the production of the F-35 final assembly and checkout for Japanese assembly.[5] Even if the U.S. government will have the final say about the extent of technological transfer, Lockheed is optimistic about it. 

To sum it up, the Obama administration has adopted, as already advertised back in 2008, a hawkish military approach towards North Korea – also helped by the growing perception of China as a military threat and the unfolding of operations in the Iraq and Afghanistan, moving the security emphasis progressively back to the Pacific shore – and a hawkish-dovish approach as regards to diplomacy, quickly pushing hard sanctions after the 2010 incidents – with the strong support of South Korea’s conservative government[6] – but also being quick to interpret Pyongyang’s message about its willingness to negotiate again by mid-2011. One reason both sides seem more willing to talk now is .


[1] For instance, the conservative newspaper Chosun Ilbo recently asserted that “Pyongyang should remember that N. Korea was only drawn back to the dialogue table on the understanding that talks with South Korea come before any talks with the U.S.”

[2] An undeniably surprising statement, taking into account that, until as recently as last month, the regime no longer referred to the possibility of abandoning its nuclear capability in return for political and economic concessions, instead arguing that it would only feel no need to retain its nuclear weapons once the American nuclear threat was removed and South Korea was cleared of its nuclear umbrella – an unlikely scenario, as it would require the end of the US–South Korea alliance.

[3] Despite this move, the U.S. is also seen as quietly pressuring Seoul to stop obsessing about the apology for the Cheonan sinking and move on with dialogue.

[4] Korea is currently seeking to develop domestic multirole fighters with stealth capability and purchase 60 high-end aircraft from a foreign aerospace company.

[5] Italy, which plans to buy some 130 F-35s, has also been allowed to have a final assembly line to produce its own F-35s as well as the ones it will deliver to the Netherlands.

[6] Despite the fact that South Korea has been the biggest economic loser of the sanctions, with an estimated $2.5 billion in trade losses, mostly related to the Kaesong industrial complex.

The EEAS revolution

After a long absence, mainly due to the author's overload of work (combining professional obligations with two Masters' programs at the same time is no easy task), Foreign Policy Watch is ready to go again. To start the revival, I will reuse a paper I presented a month ago for my Master's in European Studies.

After reading a rather uninspiring -- just another article criticising the EEAS and the EU's seemingly non-existant foreign policy, so nothing new here -- piece on the European External Action Service on Project Syndicate, I have thought it would be nice sharing my alternative, rather positive view of probable policy spillovers that we could witness  as the youthful and insecure EEAS hopefully matures into a more stable and decisive body. Enjoy!

The EEAS revolution: the role of the European External Action Service in promoting accountability in foreign policy and deepening the European integration process

Abstract

With less than one year of existence under its belt, the European External Action Service is still in the process of becoming a full-fledged reality. Any analysis of the current state of affairs and predictions about its future evolution will be inconclusive.

However, it is not too early to discern the positive developments its inception and successive growth will surely bring about to both the European Union and the world of diplomacy: widening the diplomatic agenda to include new global issues, reinforcing democratic accountability and accelerating the European integration process could be three of the overarching consequences of a correct and comprehensive implementation of the new EU foreign service.

Introduction

Despite the fact that it only makes a brief appearance in Article 27.3 of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, the inception of an European External Action Service is one of the most important innovations included in the failed Constitutional Treaty and rescued in the Lisbon Treaty in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy.


A direct consequence from the implicit recognition, both in the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 2008 implementation review, that EU Member States are no longer in position to face the threats and challenges of a rapidly changing world order by themselves[1], the main goal of this new European foreign service is – as stated in the Treaty – assisting the double-hatted High Representative in fulfilling her multiple tasks while acting in coordination with national foreign service corps.

Being neither part of the European Commission nor of the Council, the EEAS – which, after the Parliament Decision of 8 July and the Council Decision from 26 July 2010, was officially launched on the symbolic date of the one-year anniversary of the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty (1 December 2010) – will still be dominated by officials coming from both institutions, while also adding a significant number of seconded officials coming from the diplomatic services and the foreign ministries of the 27 Member States (which will conform at least 1/3 of the total work force of the EEAS). They are currently being dispatched to the almost 140 EU Delegations across the world, as well as staff the headquarters in Brussels, organized in regional and thematic desks.

Generally speaking, the European External Action Service (EEAS), now at the start of a 5-year plan to become one of the world’s biggest diplomatic corps, represents a significant opportunity to enhance the EU’s foreign policy making capabilities (Whitman, 2010) based upon a more comprehensive and effective use of its vast resources and an increasingly strategic approach towards the definition and implementation of the relevant instruments. Its potential relevance explains the profusion of literature focused on how the EEAS can improve the strategic decision-making, horizontal and vertical coherence, visibility, effectiveness and efficiency of EU external action.[2] However, other potentially beneficial aspects, that we could consider the spillover effect of the new diplomatic actor, have seldom been considered among scholastic circles.

Therefore, this paper will focus on identifying and defining the scope of three related positive developments, both affecting the EU and the international community, that we envision will come hand in hand with the EEAS: the inclusion of new issues in the global diplomatic agenda, the reinforcement of the accountability and legitimacy of EU foreign policy (with its possible spillover to the methods employed by other democratic actors) and the potential of the EEAS as a tool to deepen European integration. Both the origin and the possible evolution of these developments will be explained based on existent information about the EEAS extracted from official EU documentation and scholastic papers.

New global issues in the diplomatic agenda

What can the European External Action Service, a supranational diplomatic corps representing a postmodern confederation of states and 500 millions of citizens, bring to the table of global diplomacy? The answer lies in a basic evaluation of the main characteristics and capabilities of the EU as an international actor.

Economic power, civilian power and cultural power characterize the strengths of the European Union at the international level. While it has been able to comprehensively exploit its large economic leverage, the projection of civilian and cultural power – key elements in order to consider the EU as a truly normative power – has lagged far behind its economic status. In order to maximize its international visibility and better project its soft power, the EU Member States decided to create the EEAS, a structural diplomatic body, focusing on world governance issues – the environment, human rights, human security, democracy promotion, etc. – while also including some elements of traditional diplomacy.

This duality faithfully reflects the two hats the High Representative wears: the Council’s, representing the traditional interstate diplomacy, and the Council, father of the postmodern identity of the EU and responsible for the structural diplomacy elements of the EEAS – whose delegations will receive orders from the Commission in the fields it has competence (Priego, 2011).
However, the key differential element of the EEAS should be multiplying the EU’s capacity to project its soft power and the views upon which it is based. Taking an active role in world diplomacy via a pan-European, non-traditional foreign service will help the EU in its goal of including emerging global challenges – such as climate change or sustainable development, as well as human rights promotion[3] – and pushing up their priority among the ever-conservative world of diplomacy.

Making Europe’s voice heard also involves being innovative and actively defending the Union’s principles. By bringing a breath of fresh air to the international diplomatic agenda, the EU will also reinforce its own global, united position and become more assertive and effective in international negotiations related to global governance issues.[4]

Reinforcing the accountability, legitimacy and transparency of EU foreign policy

A traditional weak point (or, some would argue, strength) of national foreign policy structures has been political and democratic accountability, as well as transparency over the policies pursued and their implementation methods. Even if foreign ministers are accountable to the national parliaments and can be replaced by governmental decision, the overall apparatus, including the diplomatic corps, have famously been independent from political and public scrutiny.

Will that also be the case with the EEAS? Although Bátora (2010) asserts that democratic accountability has been overlooked in the process of defining the functioning of the EEAS[5], many signals point towards yet another first of the EU-way. Modern foreign policy should, despite the resistance from diplomatic circles, be compatible with the democratic accountability and decision-making processes. In order to do that, the EEAS should resist isomorphic pressures putting emphasis on plain effectiveness – to the detriment of transparency and democratic accountability – and acknowledge the fact that modern democracies, ruled by the growing interconnectedness of internal and external policy, don’t consider democratic accountability and foreign policy effectiveness as being incompatible. 

If a global actor is especially ready to accept this principle, it must be the EU[6]: a supranational actor with a newly conferred legal personality (officially, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) whose external action, as detailed on Article 21 TEU, is meant to focus on the very same values inherent to the European project, including promoting democratic values and good governance. In other words, the EU should lead by example, and the sheer visibility of its foreign service – with almost 140 delegations all over the world – should make its own democratic accountability and legitimacy – both to internal EU publics and external stakeholders –a key concern, capable of defining the whole sustainability of the European foreign action.

Despite the concerns expressed by authors as Bátora, the European Parliament has made sure that its influence and supervisory role of the EEAS went far beyond of approving its budget – in itself an already influential control mechanism.[7] Political and democratic accountability of the EEAS vis-à-vis the EU institution that basically gives democratic legitimacy to the EU also encompasses the direct supervision of the two Deputy Secretary Generals and the Chief Operating Officer[8], gained on the negotiations – the so-called Quadrilogues – following the rejection by both the Commission and the European Parliament of Baroness Ashton’s first proposal for the structure and composition of the EEAS, presented on 25 March 2010, that culminated with the Madrid four-party agreement in June.

Moreover, the agreement also included direct scrutiny over new Heads of Delegation (i.e. EU Ambassadors), as the High Representative accepted, duties after the Barroso-Vale de Almeida controversy[9], that any appointed Ambassador would appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament before taking up his/her duties. Finally, the European Parliament also asked the Lady Ashton to prepare a Declaration on Political Accountability defining the main lines of cooperation between the Parliament, the High Representative and the EEAS. The result is an agreement between the institutions that provides a solid ground for cooperation and parliamentary scrutiny.

Policy communication is, together with its formulation and implementation, also a key element to attain public legitimacy and accountability, both among internal and external publics. This is the reason why, once again in an unprecedented move in the diplomatic sphere, the EEAS had to possess its own media service. However, looking at the online news site one cannot, as of June 2011, detect much activity, the latest news being from a year ago and the most relevant links bringing the user straight to the Council press website and the EU general press room. The impossibility to confirm whether this lack of activity is due to the still ongoing building of the service or due to its premature abandonment would make criticism inappropriate. However, it would be a shame that, in the era of accountability via open, easily accessible information, the EU decided not to implement an already-planned media outlet to communicate the policies pursued and executed by the EEAS to all stakeholders.

Despite this possible misstep, and taking into account the current state of affairs, the fact that the EEAS will play, together with the Commission and the High Representative, a leading role in strategic decision making concerning key foreign policy instruments such as the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the Development Cooperation Instrument or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, among others, has to be seen as a positive development for greater transparency and democratic accountability. Cooperation with the relevant Commission DGs will be intense and, although there are concerns about the delays in policy definition and implementation this could imply, visibility, transparency and efficiency will surely benefit from it.

We can, therefore, see an EEAS that, in its dual role of serving both the EU member states and the EU’s interests, will act as a cosmopolitan normative entrepreneur with multilevel and multipronged accountability, both vis-à-vis internal and external stakeholders (Bátora, 2010), built around human security principles and developing multilevel channels of communication (Martin, 2009).

The EEAS as a tool for deepening European integration

As Galeziak (2011) points out, the EU is able to deploy most foreign policy instruments any national actor could make use of, but seemingly still lacks the will to employ them strategically and coherently. Could the EEAS act as a unifying organization that helps lead reluctant Member States into the fold of EU foreign policy? Could it foster further integration? The answer to these questions should be affirmative.

Most scholars agree that the transversal role the EEAS will play can and should bring greater coherence both at the horizontal (i.e. among EU institutions) and vertical (i.e. between the EU and its Member States). From that, and also taking into account its particular organizational structure and certain innovations of the Lisbon Treaty, we can infer that it will become a tool for deepening political integration and reinforcement of the community method, with clear spillovers into the foreign policy arena. In other words, if the CFSP has been widely considered the first step towards a politically integrated EU, the EEAS could well be the second.

As Whitman (2010) points out, the 2009 Swedish Presidency advanced the notion of the EEAS as a sui generis body, separate from the Commission and the Council Secretariat. Such an approach introduced two challenges for the EEAS to overcome: inter-institutional competition and integration. While the first has already been settled with the Quadrilogues that took place during the first semester of 2010, the issue of integration is still unresolved.

The EEAS will reunite actors from the Member States, the Council and the Commission under the same roof. While this can lead to tensions, it is also a unique opportunity to promote mutual understanding between the quintessential community institution, the arm of the Member States in Brussels and foreign officials of the Member States themselves, thus creating synergies at the horizontal and vertical levels. To put it more graphically, people who worked on different documents for a same region or topic will now work together, reviewing inputs from the Commission and the Council to improve implementation and be more coherent and strategic.[10]

This positive conclusion can be reached via the application of basic principles of social psychology: the concepts of group belonging and self-identity, intimately interconnected and closely linked to the professional sphere in which the relevant subjects develop their careers. As Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) social identity theory points out, each individual defines himself in terms of belonging to a social group and looks for a positive social identity. Although this can be seen as a double edge sword – works of these authors show that small differences can provoke conflicts between groups –, conflicts due to the fact that the staff of the EEAS originated from different groups should be overcome by the osmotic absorption of the dominant in-group rules and identities of the new organization.

Organizations of all natures have a certain operational culture and identity which is, in its turn, transmitted to all its members, shaping their professional identity. In the case of the EEAS, this carries two important implications. First, the culture and identity adopted by this new organization will shape the decisions and working procedures it will adopt, a crucial aspect in a supranational entity as the EU, where different ways of operating – mainly the community/supranational and the intergovernmental methods – coexist.

In the case of the EEAS, a newly created organization, the distinctive institutional identity will necessarily derive from three main organizations: the Commission, the Council, and the national diplomatic services. As Ongaro (2010) points out, two mechanisms will determine this transfer of routines: identities traveling with the staff from their former environments and the adoption of new routines via systematic contacts with other organizations with consolidated routines. 

Taking into account that most EEAS staff has been transferred from the Commission and that former employees of both the Council and the Commission come, despite their different procedural methods and environments (see above), from the same supranational entity and bureaucratic machine, the most plausible is that a novel set of routines, stemming primarily from the Commission but also influenced by Council identities, will take hold.[11] 

This has, subsequently, a clear implication as far as organizational culture is concerned: the community method will prevail in the collective image of the EEAS. Implications of this could be wide-ranging, one of them being that the key body of EU representation and foreign policy implementation would probably tend to implicitly prioritize internally and externally coherent and cohesive policies. As the EEAS will have a key role in the foreign policy-making process, the logical outcome should be recommendations that prioritize the Union’s view over possible diverging interests of the Member States, thus creating a down top effect to further integration. 

Additionally, as pointed out by Quille (2010), the Lisbon Treaty also reinforces the role of EU Member States in the areas of CFSP policy planning, formulation and implementation. Although seemingly contradictory with a reinforced, more coherent EU foreign action, and even further from the prospects of deepening integration, multilateral and multilevel governance of foreign policy issues could help reduce the inherent fear national political and diplomatic elites have towards the loss of sovereignty in the realm of external policy. 

In its turn, this direct participation in EU policies would give the states a greater sense of ownership in EU policies and reinforce their confidence in Brussels structures – namely the High Representative and the EEAS –, which should increasingly feel and be entitled to design and execute the CFSP on behalf of all Member States.[12] In other words, this apparent step back could create strong synergies that would let the European Union take several steps forward in the political integration process.

The European External Action Service should provide continuous bottom-up analysis simultaneously to the EU institutions and Member States, which will favor common positions of the Union, in particular with regard to matters of a geographical or thematic nature. This will, in its turn, facilitate the convergence of Member States’ national interests and the emergence of a truly common foreign policy (de Vasconcelos, 2010).

A final aspect that should be taken into account, a combination of conjectural and structural factors, would be the probable downscaling of the diplomatic corps of several Member States. Smaller European countries, with limited foreign policy budgets and already without diplomatic representation in many countries, can have a natural tendency to rely on ever more efficient and able EU delegations to service their citizens.[13] This logical tendency can be amplified by a conjectural factor that is affecting many European countries: the debt crisis, which obviously affects national spending. One of the budget allocations where cuts would carry less political and social cost is, quite obviously, foreign affairs. Therefore, budgetary restraints, combined with a display of reliability and efficiency by EU delegations, could only accelerate this downscaling process.

Conclusions

With just a few months of life under its belt and its structure still far from being fully developed, any analysis of the accomplishments of the EEAS until now will be far from relevant or fair. 

However, initial trends can easily come to shape future developments, thus making it relevant to trace the first steps of this new CFSP instrument. Specifically designed to assist the High Representative in its tasks, both at the Headquarters in Brussels and in the almost 200 delegations the EU has abroad, the EEAS could play a key role in reverting two of the most criticized aspects of EU foreign action: its lack of cohesion and coherence, both at the vertical (i.e. between the EU and its member states) and horizontal (i.e. between the different EU institutions and policies) levels.

Such improvements will create synergies that, in its turn, could have a spillover effect that would advance political integration at the European level, promote democratic accountability and legitimacy for the European foreign policy and effectively push for the introduction of new and relevant topics into global diplomatic debates. 

Being dependent of both the Commission and the Council, although namely with a stronger output from the former, the EEAS is well positioned to build stronger bridges between community policies and the still intergovernmental CFSP. This would create a culture of cooperation within the foreign policy structure that should reinforce the community idea. Moreover, greater direct participation by Member States could also work towards reducing their reluctance towards moving from a divisive intergovernmental approach towards a more integrated and coherent European foreign policy.

Strict adherence to the wording used in the treaties has been a contentious issue throughout CE/EU history. Although the Lisbon Treaties include clauses explicitly aimed at avoiding the natural expansion of community competences in the field of CFSP, some degree of gradual, seamless integration at that level cannot be ruled out. This does not imply that the EEAS will engulf national diplomatic missions anytime soon, but the expected role of support and coordination could evolve into a stronger leadership position, provided political will and momentum are found. The current economic crisis could also play a role, pushing smaller Member States to cede their diplomatic representation abroad to the relevant EU Delegations, thus accelerating the integrative process.

In a rapidly evolving international context, shaped by a seemingly unstoppable transfer of power from West to East, the EU and its member states should make sure to have one single voice in the international arena. It is no longer a matter of speaking louder: as we move forward ahead, uncoordinated European nations would surely struggle at even making their voices be heard. 

Strengthening the role of the EEAS and, in turn, of the High Representative, could only be seen as a positive step towards a more unified Europe, projecting its soft civilian and normative power with greater effectiveness, both in its troubled immediate neighbourhood and further afield. Having a single and unconventional diplomatic voice will also help the EU in its goal of including emerging global challenges – such as climate change or sustainable development, as well as the respect for human rights – into the international diplomatic agenda, so far almost exclusively concerned with traditional transnational policy issues.

One of the most recognizable strengths of the EU is its comprehensive soft (civilian and economic) power, which should allow for an effective use of the less intrusive foreign policy instruments available: classic diplomacy, transformative diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. In order for the EU to optimize their use, the EEAS must surpass the limits of a CFSP that has so far been conceived on the basis of the minimum common denominator: only then will the EEAS harness all its potential as normative power and democratic legitimacy multiplicator, able to project and self-reinforce core EU values such as democracy and good governance. 

However, it will only go as far as the Member States are willing it to go (Verluise, 2010). Although initial perspectives seemed to tilt towards the negative side – especially based on TEU Declarations 13 and 14[14], which considerably limited the margin of maneuvering of both the High Representative and the EEAS –, subsequent negotiations and developments allow for a much more positive outlook.

To sum it up, and using Priego’s (2011) words, the EEAS is a key step towards European integration that will strengthen the EU’s role as a global actor while transforming diplomacy itself.

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[1] A vision reinforced in the document Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities, issued by the reflection group led by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González and including 2 chapters (out of a total 9) devoted to EU foreign action, which asserted that the European Union must choose between becoming either a global agent of change or preparing for a managed decline into irrelevance. Moreover, the report also suggests the creation of a specific unit specializing in prevision and analysis inside the framework of the EEAS.

[2] A non-exhaustive list would include works by Bátora (2008), Cellerino (2010), Missiroli (2007), Keukeleire and Smith (2010), Galeziak (2011), Gavas and Maxwell (2010), Quille (2010) or Verluise (2010).

[3] Implicitly in line with this reasoning, the EEAS will include a specific Human Rights structure both at its headquarters in Brussels and in all relevant delegations abroad.

[4] We can find a very recent example thereof in the hard position taken by the European Union on climate change, announced on 20 June 2011, tying advances in Kyoto Protocol compliance to overall efforts by other powers.

[5] He even adds that the very composition of the service raised democratic issues already far before its final inception, as shown by the 2005 reports by the Commission and the Parliament mentioning the service could have a ‘life of its own’.

[6] Even if we have to acknowledge that the EU itself faces problems of democratic accountability, which were however remarkably addressed in the Lisbon Treaty by heavily reinforcing the role of the European Parliament and also giving a voice to the national parliaments.

[7] In fact, as commented by Quille (2010), Member States attempted to push forward a different structure to fund the EEAS, but the position of the European parliament – i.e. assigning it a separate budget line of the European Union – prevailed, thus being subject to the budgetary discharge rights of the European Parliament.

[8] In this aspect, the often criticized vertical structure of the EEAS – chosen instead of a more horizontal approach – makes it possible for the European Parliament to exert a more direct and effective political supervision and control over the foreign service and its top officials. Moreover, as argued by Galeziak (2011), given the multitude of tasks the High Representative needs to fulfill, a strong figure – the Executive Secretary General – that will ensure the correct functioning of the Service and a second authority – the Chief Operating Officer – should provide a positive asset for the running of the Service.

[9] In an extremely controversial move that allegedly did not have the agreement of the High Representative, Durao Barroso, the President of the Commission, appointed his fellow Portuguese and close collaborator, the Director-General for External Relations (RELEX), Mr Vale de Almeida, as Ambassador of the Union Delegation in Washington. 

[10] The fact that EEAS personnel come from three different sources should not be a major worry for them to acquire a shared culture: even the most powerful foreign service of our days, the US Foreign Service, divides its staff in three blocs according to their precedence.

[11] Verluise (2010) gives us some detailed insight on the practical signification of this shared identity. According to the French analyst, the this invisible cultural cleavage will mean that the community culture, inherited from the DG Relex, will take hold in the geographic and thematic desks, as well as in the delegations, while the intergovernmental culture, stemming from the Council, will have a bigger weight in the semi-autonomous crisis management structures.

[12] Ideally, the Member States will take decisions at the Council level based on the proposals – including those for military cooperation and resource pooling – presented by the High Representative and drafted in close cooperation with the EEAS (and the Commission when applicable).

[13] It must be noted, however, that some commentators argue that this process can also naturally occur with other Member States’ embassies or consulates: nationals of any EU country, who are allowed to seek assistance from the diplomatic services of any EU Member State when abroad, can indeed choose the most reputed consulate – as far as efficiency and standards are concerned –, and not necessarily the EU delegation.

[14] Declaration 13 states that the High Representative and the EEAS do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States as they currently exist, while Declaration 14 adds that the High Representative and the EEAS will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in international organizations.

European Smart Power

Inspiration struck while reading Joseph S. Nye's article in The World Ahead, the latest Foreign Affairs special issue. There he argues that America is not in absolute but in relative decline, and will thus have to learn to share the spotlight with other nations -- namely China --, due to their rising power there are still some worrying signs, namely the mounting government debt, primary and secondary education failure and political gridlock. However, he rightly assesses that America is still seen as 'the place to be' almost everywhere in the world: it is an enormous magnet of talent thanks to its famed multiculturality, openness and social mobility. In the words of the U.S. State Department policy czar Ann-Marie Slaughter, the U.S. can be defined as a country whose 'culture of openness and innovation will keep it central in a world where networks supplement or even replace hierarchical power.'

However, both these assessments fail to consider another huge, looming problem America has, one that has been very recently pointed out by several New York Times columnists: growing inequality and the alarming concentration of wealth in the higher echelon of U.S. society. Nicholas Kristof's latest piece -- which is, in fact, an even more pointing follow-up to his already polemic column "Our Banana Republic" -- is a very vivid account of this reality, as was Frank Rich's fittingly entitled piece, published only a few days before.

What Nye fails to acklowledge in his profuse analysis of America's ailings is that two of the most dramatic, indebtness and the inadequate schooling system, could be solved with one simple and not so unpopular move: raising income (and not corporate) taxes for the rich -- and no, letting the Bush tax cuts expire won't be enough mid-term. I won't elaborate too much on economic arguments for that: you can just read Mr. Rich's and Mr. Krystof's excellent articles to find them clearly explained in plain terms. There is also an excellent article by Roger Altman and Richard Haas in the same Foreign Affairs special issue, in which they also argue that tax increases are sorely needed. Using their own words, 'the only sound approach (to stabilize the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio) is a mix of spending reductions and taxt increases. [...] Raising taxes is unavoidable'.

Despite the mounting evidence, the political gridlock Mr. Nye points out means America will probably stay put on that, thus deepening the potentially damaging effects to its current prowess. In any case, we can not blame political bickering as the cause for that, nor just globalization trends: as Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson say in their new book, “Winner-Take-All Politics”, rising inequality is instead the result of policies championed by Washington Democrats and Republicans alike, in their a bidding war for donors in election after election.

How can we relate all that to Europe? The answer is easy: we have a window of opportunity, and we should not miss it. Europe has a chance. I call it European smart power, i.e. not based on the American version -- in Hillary Rodham Clinton's words, 'elevating diplomacy and development alongside defense' -- but on a genuinely European approach: attracting top talent lead in knowledge and innovation by promoting and reinforcing European strengths.

Let's apply a basic SWOT (strenghths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis to Europe. First, it is clear that we possess several strengths compared to other world regions: a rich cultural and historical heritage, a varied and savory gastronomy, unparalleled safety, top-notch healthcare and, of course, an undeniable economic prowess that fuels the most advanced welfare states in the world. What about the weaknesses? Using Joseph Nye's concepts, they are more 'relative' than 'absolute': Europe lacks the perceived openness, upward mobility and opportunities the U.S. has. In other words, and knowing the actual situation, it's rather a legacy and image problem than a real weakness. What are the threats we face? Well, we have a long list of items here, but we could easily sum it up: the same the U.S. faces plus an ageing population. And, finally, let's make our opportunity clear: to truly become the leading world region on the basis of an attractive lifestyle and a knowledge-rich society.

So, how can Europe achieve it? The answer should be applying a two-folded strategy. First, pumping money where it is most needed and where it gives the most returns in the context of our knowledge-based, postmodern society: education, science, technology and research. But that is not enough: Europe needs to market itself better, builing upon its unique attractiveness, to attract the people who could benefit from the aforementioned increase in resources. 

According to 2007 data, the U.S. clearly leads in terms of investment in reseach and development, at $370 billion (2.7% of its GDP), while the European Union came third as a block with just $263 billion, right behind from high-growing Asia. Europe should and could revert that. Top European researchers -- not just Indian and Chinese, as Mr. Nye argues -- also work in America. The reasons are crystal clear: funding and pay are far higher over there. How can European institutions expect to retain (or attract) top talent with salaries that barely allow to pay the rent and buy enough food for the month? Of course, thinking of buying a house, or even an appartment, is just a dream for most Europe-based researchers.

The U.S. also leads the world of higher education, dominating all the rankings of top universities, both in overall terms and specific knowledge sectors. Students from all over the world are willing to pay the high tuition costs in exchange for what is undeniably very high-level education. Can Europe compete with that, or is it just a dream if you drift too far away from Oxford and Cambridge?

The answer is yes, Europe can compete, but it must show resolve to do it. And resolve means putting money where it is needed, even in times of austerity. This seemingly contradictory goal can be attained applying a dual strategy, both at the EU and the national level.

First, the EU should take the chance offered by the upcoming negotiation of the 2014-2020 financial and budgetary framework to decidedly revamp its outdated and uncompetitive Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which absorbs more than 40% of the Union's yearly budget. The European Commission has already proposed focusing more on environmental preservation and less on direct subsidies for farmers, specially cutting those for wealthy landowners or tying them to employment generation. However, we can clearly read between the lines that overall CAP expenditure is set to decline in the next multi-annual financial perspectives. 

To the dismay of Spain and France, nations such as Germany and the United Kingdom, which have recently pushed for budgetary restraint at the EU level, will be delighted. This should be leveraged by the European Commission and the European Parliament to extract some concessions out of these two reluctant spenders: in other words, they could be willing to accept significant EU budget increases in exchange for the reassignment of expenditures, with less money going to agricultural subsidies and more going into Europe-wide R+D projects. Of course, even if all the money currently spent on the CAP went to R+D, this would mean just 0.4% of European GDP. However, such a symbolic -- and also material -- move to shift a substantial amount of European funds to research and development would send a strong signal to everyone involved, of course including national governments.

However, as previously argued, the total EU budget is, at 1% of total European GDP, too small to make the difference Europe needs. Most of it (70% and rising) currently comes from member states' direct, GDP-based contributions, so it is quite understandable why most are increasingly reluctant to see the budget grow. Therefore, some kind of European tax makes sense. As much as six different ideas have been suggested by both the European Commission and the European Parliament, but only two of them would probably be substantial and feasible enough: a tax on bank transactions and an European income tax.


While the first option would be the most emotionally-fitting candidate, specially after the mounting bank bailouts European governments are suffering (last in line: the big Irish banks), it would probably make less sense than a modest -- let's say something around 2-3%, obviously modulated according to different income level ratios, so that the rich pay more than the rest -- European-wide income tax. It is quite obvious that the partition of funding between member states would not be fundamentally altered (i.e. the rich would still pay more), but the perception of fairness would be greatly increased. Moreover, with European governments set to cut expenses but not ready to accept the domestic political costs of tax raises, an EU-levied tax could be seen as a good scapegoat: member states could cut their expenses in some areas where competences are shared with the EU and blame Europe for the tax hike, while the EU could then properly fund, among others, academic and R+D projects.

In any case, the supranational level is not enough. How can national governments up the R+D ante in the midst of widespread budgetary cuts and within the context of a debt-threatened Eurozone? Military expenditure could be a big part of the answer. Europe, within the NATO umbrella and already 20 years removed from the Cold War era, is now a very safe place. Of course, a wider and deeper partnership with Russia, both in economic and military terms, would help a great deal in deepening the sense of security. The case for greater economic integration was already made just a month ago in this blog; as far as military integration is concerned, Russia is already set to become a preferential partner of the Atlantic Alliance after the NATO Heads of State and Government meeting in Lisbon. If both developments take place in the near future, Europe's hard power needs will diminish even further.

In this era of understandable fiscal austerity, European countries should further cut their military budgets. This should not necessarily curtail their citizens' security: both NATO and the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are ideal supranational structures for states to profit from the economies of scale of paneuropean cooperation. A good way to start would be, for instance, using the recent Franco-British treaty as a framework for a wider structured cooperation strategy at the EU level. 

That would free up some money at the national level, that could and should be directed to funding research, development and education programs. Spending cuts in R+D such as the ones included in the Spanish government's 2011 budget are shortsighted and unacceptable. EU-level pressure should be applied: fiscal restraint is obviously needed, but the solution is not mortgaging the future like that. Military budget cuts might not be enough, either, but should be part of the fix to both deficits, fiscal and in research funding.

Despite all that, creating high-tech centers, in which publicly funded research programs would seamlessly mix with private initiatives and innovative start-ups, or properly funding universities across the continent, including generous grants for top students, both European and foreign, will not be enough if we do not market Europe as an attractive destination for bright minds. Europe must make everyone clear how appealing the European way of life can be.

The EU has the hardware it needs for showing off. First, most EU countries enjoy top-notch infrastructure, only comparable to that in Japan and, increasingly, coastal China. In contrast, U.S. infrastructure is in urgent need of a major overhaul, which is not likely to happen anytime soon. On top of that, European towns and cities also offer the most extensive and efficient public transportation networks in the world, also only paralleled in Japan and increasingly in China. U.S. public transportation systems are, with very few exceptions -- the long-suffering MTA is the most prominent example --, in no way comparable to Europe's. These two elements combine to offer an energy-efficient, confortable commuting and travelling environment, complete with high-speed rail and (extremely) low-cost flights connecting all major Western and Central European cities.

Speaking of European cities, their relatively compact dimensions also allow for livelier environments, full with parks, shops, cafés and bars, restaurants, theaters, pubs or other recreational offers, fully accessible without having to use a car to move around.  European-style downtowns, which combine remarkable architecture with lively streetlife, are almost unheard of in the sprawling American cities.

And there is still much more in the European way, starting with the unparalleled cultural and historical heritage the Old Continent boasts, undeniable an appealing asset for many people. Religious freedom is guaranteed everywhere in the European Union. Traditions and folklore, old and new, art and music: it all combines in a way that can full everyone's senses. And who could resist a meal at a tidy French restaurant, or a dinner out with some tapas and good wine? Or, why not, a Viennese coffee with an authentic apple strudel. Oh, and in case you feel indisposed, Europe also boasts top-notch healthcare, free for everyone, just like schools and many other services.

Traditions, culture, infrastructure, gastronomy, welfare state: an undeniably appealing mix of virtues that the European Union and its member states should work much harder to properly market in their fight to recruit the brightest minds. Obviously enough, these perceived advantages alone will not do the trick; however, when coupled with increasing remuneration and research funding, they can be a very powerful tool to help shape this vision of a knowledge- and lifestyle-based European smart power.

Of course, after extensively dealing with both the U.S. and the European Union, one question still looms: What about China? Are we leaving it out of this discussion?  Well, the fact is, the Chinese are not yet good enough at smart power, although they surely have their own vision, conveniently branded harmonious world. China has a rich  and fascinating historical, philosophical and cultural heritage, and it is striving to expand its values all over the world; for instance via the ever-growing number of Conficius Institutes it sponsors and runs in many corners of the globe, in what is a laudable and rather effective soft power tool. However, the real attraction China holds for most foreigners, be it Europeans, Africans, Americans or Asians, is doing business; and even here they encounter barriers, both technical and cultural, that hinder most relations. Moreover, appealing as it might be, Mandarin is also a barrier for most foreigners. In fact, one of the reasons that explains America's cultural dominance is also the relative simplicity of the English language, which combines the limited-character Latin alphabet with relatively simple grammatical rules and syntactic structures.

As far as hard power is concerned, although China's military is growing at an alarmingly rapid pace, its strength and capabilities won't be comparable to NATO's in the future to come. Moreover, China's setting in Asia is not the best to solidify its hard power structure, as it is surrounded by wary nations -- such as India or Pakistan, or even the 'rebellious province' of Taiwan -- whose militaries can and will probably also be a threat to Chinese supremacy.

Therefore, Europe must take this chance without much hesitation. The Europe 2020 strategy, one of its stated targets being that 3% of the EU's GDP (public and private combined) be invested in R&D/innovation, can help a great deal. However, this new European strategy will probably not be enough under its current recommendation and cooperation-based setup: greater commitment at both the EU and the member states level is needed if we want to avoid the unfulfillment of the Lisbon strategy for the period 2000-210.

European nations should leave fuzzy goals behind and start seriously working together for the future. The window of opportunity is open right in front of our eyes: let's make the most of it before it is truly too late. We have the economic prowess to do it: we just have to learn how to harness it. The U.S. Constitution gives all Americans the right to pursue happiness. Meanwhile, the European welfare states and modern economies offer the tools to do it.

Europe should focus on a different kind of smart power: one that relies on a 'softer' form of hard power and a revamped, more appealing form of Western soft power. If we take the right steps and make use of our undeniable strengths, opportunities will become reality.