American symbolic power projection: Syria as a response to the Palestinian blunder

After its diplomatic near-isolation in the recent UN vote to give observer status to Palestine, and with the Iranian crisis still unresolved, the United States will strive to reestablish its symbolic leadership role in world affairs by promptly recognizing the Syrian rebels as the legitimate government of the embattled country, thus opening the door to greater involvement in the ongoing, bloody civil war.

Face-saving and symbolism do matter in international relations, especially when it comes to great or hegemonic powers whose privileged position of dominance seems threatened, such as today's United States. The recent UN General Assembly vote on Palestine, in which the US joined just seven other nations apart from Israel (most notably Canada, the Czech Republic and a bunch of Pacific microstates) in trying to deny the Palestinian Authority 'non-member observer status' (and everything it entails). Even America's 'special partner', the United Kingdom, abstained, together with schadenfreude obsessed Germany. This abrupt show of diplomatic near-isolation will probably have further consequences for the geopolitics of the Middle East.

With the Iranian nuclear crisis still far from being resolved -- an Israeli strike has never been off the table -- and the upcoming North Korean satellite/ballistic missile test, perfectly timed to defy America's chief allies in the region -- Japan holds an early general election on December 16, while South Korea will have its presidential election on December 18, with the first anniversary of Kim Jong-il's death sandwiched right in between --, the Obama administration, with the political reassurance that only four more years in office can bring, will probably seek to reaffirm its wounded symbolic leadership in global affairs by heightening its involvement in yet another crisis involving the Arab world, Syria's civil war, namely by openly backing the rebels via their recognition as the legitimate government of the country.

The time also seems right for geopolitical reasons, as America's two major strategic rivals, China and Russia, remain mired in the process of reaffirming their political, economic and military supremacy in their immediate neighborhoods: China with its much-commented squabbles and dangerous nationalistic discourse on the South and East China seas, and Russia with the still latent conflict in the South Caucasus and Georgia, its suspicious political union with Lukashenka's Belarus and the Soviet-era throwback Customs Union, so far including just Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, with Kyrgyzstan set to join soon. Indeed, Russia's comprehensive bid to consolidate its power within the former Soviet area even includes a highly symbolic proposal to recreate the former Soviet soccer league, which has reportedly been well received by relevant clubs far West of Moscow.

Therefore, despite China and, above all, Russia's staunch support of the Assad regime both for economic (arms sales, anyone?) and geostrategic reasons (Syria's Tartus naval base is the last Russian military base outside the former Soviet Union), opposition could be handed with the usual mix of diplomatic sticks and carrots -- any deal could be sweetened by offering to withdraw outstanding minor WTO trade suits with China and proposing further cooperation with NATO via minor concessions on existing differences to Russia.

We should not expect, however, an unilateral decision: in order to offset Chinese and Russian reticence, the Obama administration should seek agreement by and coordination with its NATO allies. That should not prove overly difficult: the oft-dissident France already broke the diplomatic ice barely two weeks ago by being the first Western state in recognizing the coalition of opposition groups as the legitimate Syrian government, immediately prompting questions about if and when the rest of the West would follow suit. The next step, NATO agreeing on stationing Patriot missiles along the Turkish border with Syria, is just around the corner, with strong support from Germany, the Netherlands and, of course, the U.S.

The main question marks behind this move would be related to the presence of chemical and biological weapons in Syria and El Assad's Foreign Ministry's recent threat to use them in case of 'external aggression' and, obviously enough, to the rebels themselves and the future of Syria in case the current dictatorial government is toppled. Not enough is known about these 'freedom fighters', who are thought to include several subgroups of jihadists among their ranks. Moreover, the widespread optimism that accompanied the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions has already fizzled, and for good reasons: Tunisia is mired in a deep economic crisis and (violent) political turmoil; there is still no semblance of normality in Libya, more than one year after Gaddafi's death; and Egypt's President elect, Mr. Morsi, has just passed laws granting himself total immunity and quasi-dictatorial powers, while the Muslim Brothers were busy drafting a constitution enshrining the Sharia as the main source of law in the country, prompting widespread violent protests that could spark a civil war.

Potential risks, however, will not deter the U.S. from making this diplomatic move. Only strong, combined opposition form China and Russia added to a lukewarm response by Washington's allies could put the brakes on a decision that will suppose a tactical reaffirmation of American symbolic supremacy in world affairs, even if its strategic outcomes are still far from certain.