The roles of confidence in the Iran nuclear deal

Confidence is widely understood to be a positive asset, crucial to succeed in life, to carve a successful career and, obviously enough, to maneuver towards good deals in negotiations. Reality, however, is always more complex, as the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 ‒ the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany ‒ over Tehran's nuclear program clearly demonstrate.

This rich setup of interests, personalities and priorities is bringing together those who have no confidence, those who are not so confident and those who are overconfident. If success is defined by Iran freezing its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of the tough sanctions that are crippling its economy, for the Geneva talks to eventually end up successfully, the parties should not let neither the non-confident nor the overconfident to control the agenda.

On the one hand, there are those who lack confidence in Iran, with French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius as their accidental spokesman. With his assertion that France could not accept a "fool's game" (i.e. a weak deal) with Iran, Fabius immediately killed momentum in the talks and highlighted internal divisions in the Western camp, as acknowledged by Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt via Twitter. Even if we can argue that Fabius' statement is just a reflection of French impotence in world affairs and inner lack of confidence, the main practical issue is a different one: showing no confidence in the incentives for compliance ‒ in this case, a dramatic improvement of the Iranian economy, the mandate upon which Rouhani was surprisingly elected last June ‒ and the goodwill of the opposing side, no deals are possible.

On the other hand, there are those who are brimming with confidence, headed by Israel's Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. It is easy to see how, in this case, confidence in one's power and influence can kill a deal instead of fostering agreement. While the influence of pro-Israeli hardliners and Netanyahu himself within certain sectors of America's political and economic establishment is undeniable, this overconfidence can also backfire. The diplomatic charm offensive by new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has already opened up a gap between the White House and Netanyahu's government, and Europe is quietly but robustly sending signals of its disapproval of Netanyahu's policies regarding both Palestine and Iran.

The same happens with the hawks in the U.S. Congress, who could well derail the deal by passing tougher sanctions against Iran. While swimming against the tide can reap political benefits, U.S. politicians opposing negotiations with Iran should take note of the most recent episode of Washington brinkmanship, featuring a painful Government shutdown and a last-minute increase of the debt ceiling from which President Barack Obama emerged the sole political winner. In any case, the power of these overconfident elements of the anti-deal camp should not be underestimated, as they might be capable to derail the talks or the implementation of any eventual agreements if they can impose their views by playing on the fears of the negotiators and decision-makers.

We are, therefore, in the hands of the moderately confident for some tangible outcomes to emerge from Geneva. One of, them, surprisingly, might be Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. As Iran expert Kenneth Pollack recently asserted in an interview, Khamenei's relative lack of confidence ‒ at least compared to his predecessor Khomeini ‒ has led him to give Rouhani the freedom to maneuver. Even if Khamenei does have the power to force his will through the system and to overcome the opposition, he has been willing to listen to his longtime aide Rohani.

This much was already clear last August, when Rouhani appointed outgoing Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, a pragmatist, to head Iran's nuclear program: Khamenei, not confident enough in his own power to steer Iran towards regional hegemony as a nuclear power despite internal economic hardship, was giving Rouhani the green light to negotiate, showing moderate but remarkable confidence in the new President.

Similarly, the moderate pragmatism and confidence shown by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, together with a very proactive EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, leading diplomatic efforts in Geneva and highlighting the EU's ability to lead when it speaks with one voice on the international stage, show the way to go: only a savvy combination of effective multilateral diplomacy, pragmatism and cautious optimism ‒ as opposed to threats, overconfidence and lack of trust ‒ can produce a substantial deal that can satisfy both Iran and the major powers.

As argued by Stephen Walt, this is a winnable battle by the P5+1 group. However, success will, at least on this occasion, depend on the ability of the involved parts to put their weight with the relatively confident and ignore both those brimming with confidence in their abilities to derail the talks and those threatening to derail them due to their lack of confidence. We must concur with Kenneth Pollack on affirming that this may well be the best opportunity that the West has ever had, and maybe that it will ever have, to get a deal with Iran – even if it involves accepting Iran's right to enrich uranium for nuclear energy production.

The most effective and efficient way to win the hearts and minds of those living in hostile regimes is to offer them a fair deal and to embolden the agents of change with reciprocal trust. There is too much at stake not to let the moderately confident moderates to take center stage in Geneva: let's be moderately confident that this will be the case.