Radically inverted logic

Two Spanish aid workers who had been kidnapped in Mali by Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb members were freed earlier this week after more than 9 months in capture.

Immediately after some details about the negotiation with the kidnappers were released, French President Nicolas Sarkozy criticized the Spanish negotiators, as they seemingly paid a ransom and released an imprisoned terrorist, maybe the mastermind behind many more kidnappings, in exchange for the lives of those two people. Although the French Foreign Minister pressed personally for the liberation of four terrorists in 2009 to save the life of a French national, allegedly a spy, France chose a different path when confronted with a similar dilemma in 2010: Paris, probably pushed to do so by the Algerian secret services, sent elite army units to Mauritania to try to liberate a kidnapped French engineer, Michel Germaneau, who was ultimately killed by the islamists in retaliation for the six dead left after the combined Franco-Mauritanian raid.

Is Sarkozy right to criticize the Spanish negotiators? Have they been too soft? Will this have consequences, i.e. further kidnappings? Our Western mind tends to think so: nobody wants seeing people die, but we might be tempted to assume that accepting some of the conditions imposed by the kidnappers, including the release of a dangerous terrorist, might be counterproductive and make things even more dangerous for Westerners working or helping people in those countries. It could fuel further kidnappings, further unrest. We can also tend to think that those same Al-Qaeda men will have second thoughts about kidnapping or assaulting a French national, as they already saw how Paris answers to that. Of course, in the light of recent events, they might now be tempted to kidnap Spanish nationals and wait for a hefty ransom to come.

However, this is just how our Western logic operates: we should learn to see more than that. Sarkozy should go just one step further to see how things can turn against him quickly and easily. We are not talking about men in a conventional negotiation setting, where rational logic rules: we are talking about religious fanatics, brainwashed people who have next to nothing to lose. People ready and willing to die for their cause, their hate, expecting a better life on the other side. And this changes everything.

France's violent response may well mean that these islamists now hate, more than ever before, French nationals and everything smelling of French laicism (including the recent law banning Islamic face veils from public areas). Maybe they won't kidnap any Frenchmen because they know they will not get much of a ransom, but rather plan bombings to kill people or hurt French interests, a beloved Al-Qaeda tactic which coud be much more deadly. 

Maybe they will try to kidnap Spanish citizens again, who knows. However, their 'spiritual' leaders will not have the same leverage again, they will not be able to justify their actions against Spaniards with hate, this hate that fuels Al-Qaeda terrorism. Spain came up as more tolerant country, willing to negotiate and surrender a dangerous prisoner, caring about the lives of the two kidnapped human beings at all times, even knowing the political and diplomatic consequences such moves could have.

We could even link this episode with the more recent events in Afghanistan, where two Spanish soldiers and their interpreter were killed by an Afghan driver. Shouldn't it be interpreted in the light of what Sarkozy said? Doesn't that attest that Spain is seen as a weaker country among Islamic radicals? Not necessarily: this attack is just an extreme demonstration of dissent in a war-like context, of hate against someone seen as an invader in your home country. The fact that the victims were Spanish is secondary: what matters is that they were Westerners in Afghanistan, and this alone creates resent among a portion of the Afghan population. The same resent French retaliation can cause among Maghrebi islamists. And we see the consequences resent can have.

Western leaders should learn that dealing with Al-Qaeda is not like dealing with a traditional hostile foe. Rational logic is not what fuels its members: hate and fanaticism do. And even though there are lots of examples of evil states and leaders, all those people have much to lose: many privileges, many riches, many valued lives (even if just the ones of those on top) that Western nations use as leverage in negotiations or retaliations. Not with Al-Qaeda. Just think about their iconic leader, Osama Bin Laden: if his actions were purely rational in a Western classical way, wouldn't he rather be living in a big mansion, filled with concubines, in Saudi Arabia?

Rational logic does not match well with fanaticism, and Western leaders and diplomats are just starting to grasp it, even if some seem to be readier than others.

The KPA: An army in disarray?

One more incident involving the North Korean military has added extra confusion to the already obscure developments in the socialist country. China’s official news agency reported on Wednesday that a fighter jet, probably coming from North Korea, had crashed in the northeast of the country. Pictures of the wrecked plane seem to confirm its procedence, and speculation abounds that the pilot was a defector trying to reach Russia, as China has a deal in place with Pyongyang to repatriate all Korean defectors.

At first sight, such incident looks like the result of the individual actions of a disgruntled air force pilot who risked and lost his life to abandon his crumbling nation. However, such a blunt act, coupled with the recent violent actions carried out by the Korean People's Army (KPA), can raise several questions about what might be happening inside the world’s fourth largest army.

One such doubts would be if the sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean navy corvette, last March, was orchestrated from above or not. In spite of several conspiracy theories and the vociferous claims of innocence from Pyongyang, it seems clear that a North Korean torpedo shattered the boat, killing 46 sailors. However, it is still unclear who decided the attack should be perpetrated. Assuming that the top brass of the North Korean regime ordered the sinking of the Cheonan, perhaps to bolster their image among the populace, one has to wonder why they haven't been crowing about it in public instead of issuing denials. In fact, the only (unproved) hint at claiming veiled responsibility for the sinking can be found in an (allegedly) recently published propaganda poster depicting a small navy ship being smashed by a North Korean fist (see image and related link).
 

There is a widespread assumption that the mastermind behind the attack was the younger Kim, the mysterious youngster soon to be named successor to the Dear Leader. Such defiant and violent acts are not unheard of in the North Korean hereditary regime: while preparing to succeed his own father, Kim Jong-il orchestrated two bloody attacks against South Korean interests. The first notorious incident was the 1983 Burma Bombing, in which 4 South Korean ministers and 13 top officials were killed when a bomb, aimed at then-South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan, exploded in Rangoo. And later came the 1987 bombing of the Korean Air Flight 858, which killed all 115 on board.

While Kim Jong-un's destructive role makes historical sense, and given the lack of information and knowledge about the real internal situation in the Hermit Kingdom, we can not rule out that the army might be in disarray, uncontrolled and unhappy about its role or the political future of the country. Although prestigious analysts such as A. Lankov sustain that 'he will be an obedient puppet in the hands of the people who lobbied for him', the recent disastrous currency reform, the reported reappearance of widespread hunger and the recent political moves to pave the way for the succession might have rattled some in the military.

China is not amused at this last incident. For an up-and-coming power that craves stability both home and abroad, increased turmoil in its own backyard is not welcome at all. Beijing will probably take this issue very seriously, demanding assurances that the army of the nuclear-armed regime is under control. However, it is also possible that Kim Jong-il, always an extremely shrewd negotiator, takes this opportunity to plead for even more Chinese aid. Paradigmatic experts in negotiating on the edge, the North Koreans might even have orchestrated this chaotic defection attempt --aiming at combining it with another, lesser known bargaining chip they keep up their sleeve--, in order to obtain further concessions in exchange for stability pledges.

Among all this mess of disinformation and theories, we at least know one thing for sure: North Korean minds are so complicated that no theory can be dismissed.

Pakistan’s image problem

Day after day, we are hit by ever more somber news on Pakistan. If just a month ago it was a bunch of leaked documents on the Afghan war, which clearly demonstrated the role of Pakistan’s army and secret services in protecting and helping Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, now it is a major natural disaster.

After the devastating floods that have already caused more than a thousand deaths and uncountable human suffering, now the UN is warning about a wave of epidemic diseases that could skyrocket the number of casualties, blaming the international community of being too slow and not committed enough to helping the devastated nation. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon just visited Pakistan, where local authorities claim 20 million have made been homeless by the floods, 6 million of them being at risk of starving or exposed to contaminated water. UN experts have also warned that 3,5 million children are among the affected. At the same time, the American press is warning that the floods can be an opportunity for the Taliban to solidify their grip on the region, thus hindering US efforts in Afghanistan and further destabilizing the troublesome AfPak conundrum.

While the claims made by the UN and are hard to rebate, we should stop for a minute to think why things are going this way. Of course, a key reason is the lack of total media spotlight that former humanitarian crises have enjoyed. Although information about floods and deaths in Pakistan has been constant –and the stakes are being raised right now, with the sickening numbers of affected people–, it has shared the spotlight with similar natural disasters in India and China (and even Central Europe), and also with the raging wildfires in Russia.  Moreover, international public opinion is only truly shaken when casualties are in the high thousands: floods or fires where “only” hundreds die are seen as second-rate tragedies, obviously not taking into account that the ensuing destruction is far worse than the most immediate and impactful effects.

However, there’s a second reason that explains the lack of international interest in helping out: the perceived futility of and distrust towards the Pakistani army and government. Indeed, Pakistan has a deep problem of bad reputation and a startling lack of true allies in the international theater, starting with its more immediate neighbors and top regional powers, India and China. While it is obvious that India won’t rush to help its archrival –specially since they are also facing serious floods in the disputed Kashmir area–, China is also uninterested in helping a country that it perceives as unreliable and unstable –something that really worries the Chinese, who crave stability and preservation of the status quo, both home and abroad–, one that poses a threat to the Chinese grand view of a pan-Asian sphere of prosperity under Beijing's tutelage. Enter China’s own floods, affecting the central provinces of Henan and Sichuan, and you get the full picture.

What about the US, the strongest ally of the Pakistani government, which offers aid to the tune of $1.5 billion a year –not including military cooperation– to the troubled nation? Here’s what: although the US’ has been the largest humanitarian response from any single country, it has only meant an extra $10 million and a bunch of rescue personnel and Chinook helicopters to boot. As a recent Examiner header said, what’s $10 million more between friends? Well, the answer is clear: maybe the US is not such a good friend of Pakistan, at least not for all that matters.

Once again, it is clear that the US is handing massive amounts of aid to the Pakistani authorities in order to ensure the nuclear-armed regime will not descend into chaos and will cooperate in the struggle against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Although progress in both respects can be labeled of moderate at best, the US has strong interests in preserving stability in Pakistan, although it sees the Pakistani ruling and military elite with suspicion and even despair. Of course, now the US is rushing to mollify its image: in a classic public diplomacy move, the US has pledged further aid in order to avoid fueling even further disapproval among Pakistanis. However, although the US image problem in Pakistan is deeply troubling, it looks like Pakistan’s own image problems might be far worse.

A further example is provided by the next in line of helping hands: the EU, a confederation of states whose statutes, the Lisbon Treaty, clearly specify that it will actively engage in humanitarian causes whenever needed. So where’s the European help? Nowhere to be seen. Too busy with internal economic problems, and too unwilling to get further muddled in the AfPak swamp, the EU has clearly ceded all initiative in the area to the regional powers and the US. In other words, don't count on Europe, either.

Finally, we can’t help but thinking about fellow Muslim states, which could be seen as natural allies for Pakistan. Unfortunately, they are not helping, either. The powerful and resource-rich Gulf States see Pakistan, a fellow Sunny country, as a threat to regional stability and a sponsor of radical, violent islamism, which they strongly condemn (of course, also to please its American and Chinese allies/customers). What about Iran, Egypt or Turkey? Same answer: these states, chiefly Iran and Turkey, sponsor themselves as leaders of the Muslim world, as trustful power poles that should pave the way towards greater regional development and cooperation. In this context, Pakistan is once again seen as a nuclear-armed focus of instability, a deeply unreliable regional power that sponsors disruptive forces in Afghanistan, preventing this greater pan-Muslim goal.

While there is no doubt that increased media focus and public diplomacy goals will translate into a higher level of international commitment to help Pakistan, the horrible image its government and military leaders enjoy throughout the world has turned against its own citizens, who have been literally and unfairly abandoned to their fate in the midst of a serious natural disaster. As the saying goes, humans are the only animals able to trip over the same stone twice: Pakistan's leaders should be more clever than that, learning from their public diplomacy mistakes in order to avoid this isolation to happen again.

A fourth way forward for North Korea

How should the U.S. respond to a renewed North Korean leadership under pressure by China not to open up

North Korea is up for a change in leadership, which explains the current wait-and-see approach by the Obama administration. Although the dangerous scenario of a sudden collapse can’t be ruled out, U.S. officials are working on two other possibilities: a regime as hermetic and reluctant to change as Kim Jong-Il’s or a new leadership which is open to progressive change. However, a fourth scenario, with heavy Chinese involvement, should not be ruled out.

Despite the security threat it poses to our East Asian allies and the recent recommendations by the CFR Independent Task Force on U.S. policy on Korea, the Obama administration has wisely taken a wait-and-see approach towards the North Korean Regime, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made clear during a recent official visit to South Korea: according to the South Korean’s President spokesman, “the key word” was her strategy of “strategic patience.” 

Assuming that Kim Jong Il’s poor health will lead to a leadership change sooner than later, and obviously not forgetting the sudden and dramatic collapse of the regime, the U.S. is working on two probable future scenarios: one in which the new Korean leaders decide not to open up despite international pressure and a second one in which they show receptiveness to a progressive political and/or economic aperture.

However, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and his senior advisors, including Richard Bush III, are discarding a fourth possible scenario, which is indeed a combination of the two above-mentioned possibilities: a new North Korean leadership that hints at opening up the country but encounter a cold, menacing response by China, the current lifeline of the North Korean dictatorship, forcing it to maintain the status quo.

China could certainly be interested in such an outcome. Although several experts argue that China’s engagement and defense of the North Korean regime is thinking in Cold War terms and that its stance could be somewhat counterproductive for its economic interests – namely its trade with South Korea –, several strategic factors should be taken into account. 

First of all, there is the geopolitical factor of having a debilitated friendly nation fencing the Chinese border from U.S. influenced South Korea. Secondly, there would be what we could call a “neocolonial factor”: China has growing access to North Korea’s natural resources (mostly minerals) and infrastructure, as evidenced by the recent agreement between Kim Jong-il and Hu Jintao that will allow the Chinese to use and develop the Rajin port, thus giving Chinese merchants vital access to the Sea of Japan.

These two factors could also lead to a third development: as labor costs rise, China will certainly seek to externalize the production of low value-added products, and North Korea could be a major and submissive player, which would be amenable to developing joint industrial or special economic zones under Chinese tutelage.

Therefore, for the purpose of this scenario, the U.S. should assume that any policies adopted will, at the very least, be viewed by suspicion from China. Cooperation outside the field of regional security – the eventual continuation of the Six Party Talks shall be borne in mind – should be ruled out. of It is thus imperative that the U.S. reacts with caution, applying a savvy combination of the current hard power measures – i.e. strong military cooperation with South Korea and Japan with a new soft power approach vis-à-vis the authoritarian Korean regime, which should revolve around three policy pillars.

The first engagement policy should be based on a grants program for top North Korean college students, who would be invited to attend participating world-class U.S. universities for at least one full academic year.

This public diplomacy program would aim to improve U.S. relations with North Korea and reinforce the image of the U.S. as a leading nation in higher education. If North Korea accepts the offer, then it receives much-needed expertise and know-how. If Pyongyang rejects it, publicity about the rejection might harm the regime's image, both internally and externally. The United States has a long-term goal of gaining wider approval by establishing lasting personal relationships in the education field with talented and influental young students, while also improving their access to international knowledge and special learning experiences. 

Needless to say, U.S. authorities should reassure the Korean authorities that the students would be back in North Korea after their year abroad and not be allowed to stay in the country under any circumstances, a key element to secure Pyongyang’s agreement with such proposal.

This policy, implemented with federal funds, could prove cheap and effective: for the cost of deploying just ten U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan (an estimated $10 million a year), the U.S. could pay the tuition, lodging and other expenses of up to 100 North Korean students. Moreover, given that only a limited number of scholarships would be provided, it could be readily approved by Congress: we shall remember that, every year, U.S. lawmakers pass a hefty budget for the 28.500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

The rewards would probably be modest short-term, but such an American-educated elite could also pave the way towards a future democratic regime, as the case of colonial India proves: it was the young elite with British education who pushed for democracy for the new Indian state some 60 years ago.

This program could also be complemented with various cultural and/or recreational exchanges, which would foster mutual knowledge and would allow the U.S. to leverage the overall and undeniable appeal its mass culture and entertainment, as this video shows.

A second policy element would imply increasing the information flow reaching North Korean citizens. Total isolation from the outside world has allowed the dictatorial Korean socialist regime to survive until now; however, in recent years, Chinese-smuggled cultural and informational products – mostly films in DVD format – have reached the isolated North Korean population, creating some cracks in the monolithic Stalinist society, especially among affluent, educated youth.

Therefore, the U.S. should use cover agents and intermediaries to step up these smuggling activities, ideally expanding them to encompass South Korean printed and audiovisual media. A variety of methods could be used: from camouflaged newspapers in food aid cargo, both entering by land or sea, to direct bribes for border patrols, which is the method used by Chinese media smugglers.

This activity, which should be sponsored using reserved funds and obviously never made public, would have the clear goal of reinforcing the knowledge of the outside world among North Koreans. Latent demand for Western or South Korean media products is already high among educated North Koreans, and the rest of the population could also dramatically raise its awareness of the economic reality away from the hermit kingdom’s borders if even only minimum access to non-state controlled media is provided.

The third policy element the U.S. should study would be the implementation of development, infrastructure and commercial projects, in a multilateral effort with Russia and South Korea, to undermine growing Chinese influence in the country.

Two concrete projects have already been planned but not yet executed. On the one side, Russia and South Korea are pushing for the construction of an electrified cargo railroad across North Korea that would bring South Korean goods to Russia and Europe by land, thus creating a cheap and direct transportation corridor between the two nations. The U.S. should cooperate with these two nations in convincing the North Korean government that this project could only produce revenue and jobs for the local populations, as well as development opportunities; in that sense, the U.S. could offer technical and financial support for the construction of a power plant that would provide electricity for the railroad and any surrounding towns or villages.

The second project which has already been laid out relates to bringing Russian natural gas to South Korea via a pipeline that would cross North Korea. The U.S. should get involved in that project, by providing both advanced technical expertise and financial support: that would help its regional strategic allies convince the North Korean government about the feasibility of the project, which would also provide hefty revenues for the state – an estimated $100 million a year only in transit fees – and, at the same time, show the U.S. approach towards development and its involvement in the region – as opposed to China’s foreseeable neocolonial approach –, thus improving the perception of the U.S. both among the local populations and at the government level.

The obvious conclusion is that these policies, while limited in scope and probably not self-sufficient to ignite major changes in North Korea, could be a positive first step towards an integral “smart power” approach in the Korean peninsula, under which the U.S. would distance themselves of possible Chinese power projection goals by focusing on an array of soft power initiatives – aimed at benefiting the local population while also facilitating international economic transactions and clearly improving U.S. perceptions in the area – that would complement the hard power and diplomatic measures – including a hypothetical resumption of the Six Party Talks – needed to keep the militarist regime in Pyongyang in check. 

Therefore, while their aim would clearly be undermining a hypothetical growing Chinese clout in North Korea, the specificities of these policies would make any Chinese criticism illegitimate in the eyes of the international community, and should not prevent the U.S. from further cooperating with China for the common goal of guaranteeing peace and stability in the region.