A fourth way forward for North Korea

How should the U.S. respond to a renewed North Korean leadership under pressure by China not to open up

North Korea is up for a change in leadership, which explains the current wait-and-see approach by the Obama administration. Although the dangerous scenario of a sudden collapse can’t be ruled out, U.S. officials are working on two other possibilities: a regime as hermetic and reluctant to change as Kim Jong-Il’s or a new leadership which is open to progressive change. However, a fourth scenario, with heavy Chinese involvement, should not be ruled out.

Despite the security threat it poses to our East Asian allies and the recent recommendations by the CFR Independent Task Force on U.S. policy on Korea, the Obama administration has wisely taken a wait-and-see approach towards the North Korean Regime, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made clear during a recent official visit to South Korea: according to the South Korean’s President spokesman, “the key word” was her strategy of “strategic patience.” 

Assuming that Kim Jong Il’s poor health will lead to a leadership change sooner than later, and obviously not forgetting the sudden and dramatic collapse of the regime, the U.S. is working on two probable future scenarios: one in which the new Korean leaders decide not to open up despite international pressure and a second one in which they show receptiveness to a progressive political and/or economic aperture.

However, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and his senior advisors, including Richard Bush III, are discarding a fourth possible scenario, which is indeed a combination of the two above-mentioned possibilities: a new North Korean leadership that hints at opening up the country but encounter a cold, menacing response by China, the current lifeline of the North Korean dictatorship, forcing it to maintain the status quo.

China could certainly be interested in such an outcome. Although several experts argue that China’s engagement and defense of the North Korean regime is thinking in Cold War terms and that its stance could be somewhat counterproductive for its economic interests – namely its trade with South Korea –, several strategic factors should be taken into account. 

First of all, there is the geopolitical factor of having a debilitated friendly nation fencing the Chinese border from U.S. influenced South Korea. Secondly, there would be what we could call a “neocolonial factor”: China has growing access to North Korea’s natural resources (mostly minerals) and infrastructure, as evidenced by the recent agreement between Kim Jong-il and Hu Jintao that will allow the Chinese to use and develop the Rajin port, thus giving Chinese merchants vital access to the Sea of Japan.

These two factors could also lead to a third development: as labor costs rise, China will certainly seek to externalize the production of low value-added products, and North Korea could be a major and submissive player, which would be amenable to developing joint industrial or special economic zones under Chinese tutelage.

Therefore, for the purpose of this scenario, the U.S. should assume that any policies adopted will, at the very least, be viewed by suspicion from China. Cooperation outside the field of regional security – the eventual continuation of the Six Party Talks shall be borne in mind – should be ruled out. of It is thus imperative that the U.S. reacts with caution, applying a savvy combination of the current hard power measures – i.e. strong military cooperation with South Korea and Japan with a new soft power approach vis-à-vis the authoritarian Korean regime, which should revolve around three policy pillars.

The first engagement policy should be based on a grants program for top North Korean college students, who would be invited to attend participating world-class U.S. universities for at least one full academic year.

This public diplomacy program would aim to improve U.S. relations with North Korea and reinforce the image of the U.S. as a leading nation in higher education. If North Korea accepts the offer, then it receives much-needed expertise and know-how. If Pyongyang rejects it, publicity about the rejection might harm the regime's image, both internally and externally. The United States has a long-term goal of gaining wider approval by establishing lasting personal relationships in the education field with talented and influental young students, while also improving their access to international knowledge and special learning experiences. 

Needless to say, U.S. authorities should reassure the Korean authorities that the students would be back in North Korea after their year abroad and not be allowed to stay in the country under any circumstances, a key element to secure Pyongyang’s agreement with such proposal.

This policy, implemented with federal funds, could prove cheap and effective: for the cost of deploying just ten U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan (an estimated $10 million a year), the U.S. could pay the tuition, lodging and other expenses of up to 100 North Korean students. Moreover, given that only a limited number of scholarships would be provided, it could be readily approved by Congress: we shall remember that, every year, U.S. lawmakers pass a hefty budget for the 28.500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

The rewards would probably be modest short-term, but such an American-educated elite could also pave the way towards a future democratic regime, as the case of colonial India proves: it was the young elite with British education who pushed for democracy for the new Indian state some 60 years ago.

This program could also be complemented with various cultural and/or recreational exchanges, which would foster mutual knowledge and would allow the U.S. to leverage the overall and undeniable appeal its mass culture and entertainment, as this video shows.

A second policy element would imply increasing the information flow reaching North Korean citizens. Total isolation from the outside world has allowed the dictatorial Korean socialist regime to survive until now; however, in recent years, Chinese-smuggled cultural and informational products – mostly films in DVD format – have reached the isolated North Korean population, creating some cracks in the monolithic Stalinist society, especially among affluent, educated youth.

Therefore, the U.S. should use cover agents and intermediaries to step up these smuggling activities, ideally expanding them to encompass South Korean printed and audiovisual media. A variety of methods could be used: from camouflaged newspapers in food aid cargo, both entering by land or sea, to direct bribes for border patrols, which is the method used by Chinese media smugglers.

This activity, which should be sponsored using reserved funds and obviously never made public, would have the clear goal of reinforcing the knowledge of the outside world among North Koreans. Latent demand for Western or South Korean media products is already high among educated North Koreans, and the rest of the population could also dramatically raise its awareness of the economic reality away from the hermit kingdom’s borders if even only minimum access to non-state controlled media is provided.

The third policy element the U.S. should study would be the implementation of development, infrastructure and commercial projects, in a multilateral effort with Russia and South Korea, to undermine growing Chinese influence in the country.

Two concrete projects have already been planned but not yet executed. On the one side, Russia and South Korea are pushing for the construction of an electrified cargo railroad across North Korea that would bring South Korean goods to Russia and Europe by land, thus creating a cheap and direct transportation corridor between the two nations. The U.S. should cooperate with these two nations in convincing the North Korean government that this project could only produce revenue and jobs for the local populations, as well as development opportunities; in that sense, the U.S. could offer technical and financial support for the construction of a power plant that would provide electricity for the railroad and any surrounding towns or villages.

The second project which has already been laid out relates to bringing Russian natural gas to South Korea via a pipeline that would cross North Korea. The U.S. should get involved in that project, by providing both advanced technical expertise and financial support: that would help its regional strategic allies convince the North Korean government about the feasibility of the project, which would also provide hefty revenues for the state – an estimated $100 million a year only in transit fees – and, at the same time, show the U.S. approach towards development and its involvement in the region – as opposed to China’s foreseeable neocolonial approach –, thus improving the perception of the U.S. both among the local populations and at the government level.

The obvious conclusion is that these policies, while limited in scope and probably not self-sufficient to ignite major changes in North Korea, could be a positive first step towards an integral “smart power” approach in the Korean peninsula, under which the U.S. would distance themselves of possible Chinese power projection goals by focusing on an array of soft power initiatives – aimed at benefiting the local population while also facilitating international economic transactions and clearly improving U.S. perceptions in the area – that would complement the hard power and diplomatic measures – including a hypothetical resumption of the Six Party Talks – needed to keep the militarist regime in Pyongyang in check. 

Therefore, while their aim would clearly be undermining a hypothetical growing Chinese clout in North Korea, the specificities of these policies would make any Chinese criticism illegitimate in the eyes of the international community, and should not prevent the U.S. from further cooperating with China for the common goal of guaranteeing peace and stability in the region.