Betting everything on China

How North Korea really aims at China with its threats against South Korea and the United States

Since its 12 December long-range missile / satellite launch and 12 February nuclear test – already its third, the most powerful yet and allegedly funded by and performed on behalf of Iran –, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been all over the news, most recently by threatening to cut all communication lines with Seoul and voiding the 1953 armnistice – one of the few elements that keeps the unstable peace in the Korean peninsula alive – in response to the passing of UNSC Resolution 2094, considered the most punitive to date (albeit not the harshest that could be imposed), which condemns North Korea's nuclear activities "in the strongest terms", imposes new financial sanctions, strengthens states' autohority to inspect suspicious cargo from the DPRK and imposes additional sanctions on individuals and entities.

However, further from the passing of yet another UNSC Resolution (in fact, another resolution against North Korea, no. 2087, was adopted last January), the reelection of Barack Obama or the even more recent investiture of new South Korean President Park Geun-hye, the reasons behind the unusually bellicose behaviour of the Kim Jong-un regime, dialectically already surpassing that of 2010, which preceded the shelling of the allegedly disputed Yeonpyeong island, have to be found in the menacing attitude shift coming from China. The stakes are too high for the regime, which is now resorting to indirect brinkmanship negotiation tactics to make sure China has no choice but to keep supporting it.

Several warning signs are arising from China. Although the Chinese government's worst nightmare would be a North Korean collapse, which would trigger a flood of impoverished refugees crossing China's border and create a security nightmare until North Korea's nuclear weapons were found and secured, Beijing's stance has perilously drifted from near-unconditional support to a more critical stance. Two unprecedented moves reflect this potential attitude shift.

First, critical voices from inside China's Communist Party have been allowed to publicly question Beijing's support of the Kim regime. In one of the most resounding pieces, whose publication in the Financial Times guaranteed its international impact, Deng Youwen, deputy editor of the journal of the Central Party School of the Communist Party, asserted that the benefits of this privileged relationship are unclear: ideology-based relationships are dangerous, the Cold War is over and North Korea's strategic value should not be overstated, North Korea will not reform (i.e. will not open its economy to Chinese businesses looking for cheap labor) and Pyongyang is drifting away from Beijing (i.e. it does not follow anyone's orders). In fact, Deng was just voicing the concerns of a growing number of Chinese intellectuals and party members. Despite the obvious fact that trade with North Korea has helped revitalize the impoverished Northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, especially since the start of the Northeast Asia Project in 2002, North Korea has been testing China's patience for too long, and weariness is starting to show.

This leads us to the second change in China's behaviour vis-à-vis North Korea. Until recently, Pyongyang's only ally and regime guarantor refrained from actively supporting UNSC Resolutions against North Korea, unless in those related to the 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests. However, it all changed last December, when Chinese dilomats joined their U.S. counterparts to proceed with a UNSC resolution criticizing North Korea for its latest missile launch. As asserted by Kurt Campbell, this surprised and enraged Pyongyang and set the stage for the February nuclear test, a strong warning to China that North Korea has no interest in playing the role of vassal state (i.e. what Deng Youwen qualifies of "Pyongyang drifting away from Beijing"). Not surprisingly, China played an active role in drafting UNSC Resolution 2094, implicitly threatening the eventual enforcement of these strengthened sanctions. 

In the past, China-DPRK trade has even increased in the aftermath of UN sanctions, as implementing regulations passed by the United States, the EU and other states and trade blocks were put into effect but circumvented via China, which consistently failed to create detailed lists of forbidden imports of the luxury items that the North Korean elite craves. If China's attitude changes – and that is still to be seen, although there are some early promising signs –, the effects for the luxurious lifestyle of Kim's clique could be devastating, potentially triggering severe internal discontent and instability. Further from the economic benefits for the Chinese nationals engaging in trade activities with the Korean elites, Beijing is very much aware of the risk of regime collapse if trade or aid are severely cut down. Pyongyang knows it and is playing its cards to make sure China's fears overwhelm its desire to please the international community on the North Korean issue amid growing tensions tied to its trade surplus, growing military clout and territorial demands in the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan.

Professor Jennifer Lind has ably asked herself whether China will finally bite North Korea. The answer is still up in the air and, as she says, the significance of these recent developments should not be exaggerated, as the Chinese have still watered down the degre of punishment imposed against Pyongyang despite actively backing the sanctions. Plus, if past behaviour can be of help to predict the future, Chinese firms have, with Beijing's consent, consistently helped North Korea evade sanctions. So far, the only obvious fact is that Pyongyang is placing a strong bet on its fearful brinkmanship tactics, hoping they play into Beijing's fears of instability in its backyard. We can just hope that Pyongyang's China-aimed strong words and threats do not end up in violent provocations, which could eventually trigger a disastrous major conflict.